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a b s t r a c t
The paper describes a proposed approach for operationalizing the Common Operational Picture concept
introduced in the EU FP 7 TOSCA (Total Operations Management for Safety Critical Activities) project, in
order to jointly integrate and enhance safety, quality and productivity in the production environment.
The approach combines different methods for the description and analysis of plant and operations,
including Task Analysis, 4D process simulation, hazard analysis and Pareto optimization, and iterates
through them to generate a final procedure. The proposed approach has been demonstrated on an
industrial case study related to planning of infrequent cold water pressure testing of LPG storage tanks,
and the process and results of this case study are presented and discussed. The plant management was
provided with a detailed list of the main tasks (22), sub-tasks (115), the specific risks identified (26, con-
sidering procedural delays, occupational safety and process safety) and the specific recommendations
(20) for safety and time optimization of the planned testing procedure. The approach was successfully
demonstrated as a suitable vehicle for the analysis and planning of rare, complex, unconventional work
tasks that are hard to visualize, where the establishment of a Common Operational Picture (COP) among
all relevant personnel in the hazardous operations is a must.
 2016 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
This paper describes the results of work undertaken to develop
approaches for integrating and enhancing safety, quality and pro-
ductivity under the EU FP 7 TOSCA (Total Operations Management
for Safety Critical Activities) project (http://www.toscaproject.eu).
The TOSCA framework is based on four pillars (Commitment in
Action, Understanding Hazards and Risks, Managing Risk, and
Learning from Experience) that support the establishment of
Common Operational Picture (COP; see Leva et al., 2015) among
all relevant personnel in hazardous operations; in other words,
all stakeholders develop and share the same mental model. The
term originates from the military domain where it is used to
describe the complete graphical picture of the battlefield used by
commanders to make effective command decisions (Looney,
2001). The aim of a COP is to share situation awareness among dis-
tributed stakeholders and the concept has also been applied in
emergency management and humanitarian crisis management
(McNeese et al., 2006). In addition, establishing a COP can serve
as a vehicle for integrating and enhancing safety, quality and pro-
ductivity. One of the TOSCA safety processes is Design and Plan-
ning for Safety (part of Managing Risk pillar), and to support this
pillar a risk assessment process for complex work operations has
been developed. The proposed process is suitable for assessing
risks due to, for example, the introduction of new or rarely applied
processes or procedures. The case study presented in this paper
focussed on a non-routine maintenance and inspection task. Rare
or unconventional tasks are good example of large uncertainties
(due to lack of the required information/knowledge) that can easily
lead to differences in COP among the personnel and procedure(s)
to be followed. Specifically, differences in the COP/situation aware-
ness, for example different perceptions of the involved personnel,
different execution of the hazardous procedures, or different
adherence to pertaining safety criteria to be followed, etc., can
clearly lead to accidents. Thus this paper proposes an approach
to improving the understanding of hazards, management of risks,
and communication of processes in the case of rare procedures.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ssci.2016.08.015
0925-7535/ 2016 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
Abbreviations: COP, Common Operational Picture; LPG, liquefied petroleum gas;
SCOPE, Supply, Context, Process and Effects; TA, Task Analysis; TOSCA, Total
Operations Management for Safety Critical Activities.
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The proposed approach combines four principal methods:
i. Task Analysis (TA): predominantly a human factors method,
task analysis maps out the tasks, tools, and equipment
needed to achieve the work;
ii. 4D Process Simulation: uses the task analysis to drive ava-
tars in a 3D model of the work environment. The 4D Simula-
tion can be used to communicate the process, and as the
basis for discrete event simulation;
iii. Task HAZID: identification and evaluation of hazards using
the information from the task analysis and 4D simulation;
and
iv. Optimization: identifying key opportunities to improve the
process using the task analysis, 4D simulation results, oper-
ational costs, and sensitivity analysis.
These four main steps may be iterated several times until the
task analysis is stable and includes all planned activities. The over-
all approach aims to identify potential hazards, as well as areas for
improvement, both in terms of process safety and efficiency.
This paper will explain the overall approach, methods and tools
in Section 2. In Section 3, the application of the approach and
results from the case study will be presented. The case study
concerns the rare periodic procedure of inspection of pressurized
vessels for liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) storage. The complex cold
water pressure testing procedure is applied rarely in the organiza-
tion studied (in reality every 10+ years), and thus is affected by
staff turnover, equipment changes, procedure difficulties, etc.
Hence, the plant management are keen to reduce uncertainty
around planning, monitoring, downtime and safety implications
and help ensure the safe and efficient completion of the testing.
Conclusions on the value of the recommendations generated by
this approach for the plant management from the case study, as
well as on the overall approach, are given in Section 4.
2. Approach
The approach developed in this work applies Task Analysis (TA)
to provide a detailed description of the operation under analysis,
and uses this TA as the basis for subsequent 4D modelling and
visualisation of the operation. This combination of methods pro-
vides the analysis team with a clear representation of the details
of the operation(s), equipment, resources, etc. It also enables the
team to apply the hazard identification methods and perform qual-
itative risk categories ranking, as well as consider efficiency opti-
mization (e.g., in terms of resources needed, time, staffing, and
equipment, etc.). Fig. 1 describes the overall approach and high-
lights the point at which decisions should be taken, i.e. after the
optimization step. At this point, recommendations from previous
steps are compiled and assessed for completeness and the tolera-
bility of the residual risk levels is determined. The approach also
includes the ability to iterate the task analysis to facilitate the sit-
uation where the analysis leads to changes or additions to the steps
in the operation. Each of the steps in the proposed approach are
discussed in detail in the following sub-sections.
The approach assumes that the assessment team is adequately
composed of both experienced risk assessors (e.g., considering task
analysis, HAZOP and similar methods), as well as of the diverse
technical personnel that can provide at least basic knowledge
about envisaged work procedures, equipment, documentation,
limitations, contractors, etc. Considering Fig. 1, the ‘‘End
(Reporting)” is to be reached when the team members reach a
common understanding (or COP) about the operation under analy-
sis and relevant operational and safety issues.
2.1. Task analysis
Task analysis is a method originating from the human factors
discipline that is used to describe human actions and interactions
within a system. It forms the basis of further analysis of human
activity within a system, and can be described as the analysis of
how a task is accomplished. A task analysis includes a detailed
description of the physical and/or mental activities undertaken
by human actors, information on the task durations, frequency,
complexity and allocation to human or other agents as well as
describing the location or environment in which the task takes
place, equipment and information required to complete the task,
and any other factors of interest to the specific analysis (Kirwan
and Ainsworth, 1992). The task analysis is an important represen-
tation of the operation and overall socio-technical system and pro-
vides a solid foundation for the subsequent system analysis that
helps ensure comprehensive identification and evaluation of all
relevant hazards and risks. The most common form of task analysis
is Hierarchical Task Analysis (HTA; Annett and Duncan, 1967) and
variations include Link Analysis (Chapanis, 1996), Operational
Sequence Diagrams (Kirwan and Ainsworth, 1992), Cognitive Task
Analysis (CTA; Stanton et al., 2005) as well as methods used more
widely outside the human factors domain such as Business Process
Modelling (Aguilar-Saven, 2004). Task analysis methods including
hierarchical task analysis and process mapping are widely used
in the design of procedures (e.g. Embrey, 2000; McCarthy et al.,
1998) and as the basis for analysing safety, particularly when
accounting for possible human errors (Balfe and Leva, 2014). In this
approach and case study, the Business Process Modelling approach
was applied as incorporated in the SCOPE software tool (Supply,
Context, Output, Process and Effects; McDonald et al., 2011). The
SCOPE software represents the task analysis in the form of a
process map and links each task within this map to a template
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Fig. 1. The graphical presentation of the proposed approach.
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for hazard identification, using a technique similar to HAZOP
(Kletz, 2006). Information to populate the task analysis is typically
gathered from documentation, particularly procedures, where
available, but also incorporates experiences of teammembers. Task
analyses are also frequently refined through iterations, particularly
when a clear procedure is not already defined, as was the situation
in this case study. Interaction with the 4D modelling helps to facil-
itate the identification of constraints and alternative procedures
that drive the iterations.
2.2. 4D modelling
Simulation can be defined as the use of a model to imitate a
real-world process or system over time and 4D simulation
describes the integration of a 3D computer model of an area with
time related or schedule information with the first requirement
being a 3D model representing the key characteristics of the envi-
ronment in which the process will take place (Banks et al., 2001). In
some cases, a 3D model of the plant or site may already be avail-
able from design works or in the form of a Building Information
Model. In other cases a new model can be constructed from draw-
ings, from laser scanning, or, as in this case, from photogrammetry.
Once the 3D model is combined with schedule information, the
simulation can then depict the operation of the process over the
fourth dimension, time. The combination of schedule information
and 3D models to create a 4D simulation of a process in order to
assess health and safety issues has previously been applied in the
construction industry (e.g. Ganah and John, 2011; Ciribini and
Galimberti, 2005), but here we apply a more detailed task analysis
rather than high level schedule information. The specific approach
used in this paper focuses on the use of discrete-event simulation,
which models a process as a discrete sequence of well-defined
events in time where each event occurs at a specific time and
marks a state change in the process (Robinson, 2004). To achieve
discrete-event simulation, the process must have a predetermined
start and end point and the events to be simulated must occur
between these points.
Although currently 4D simulation is perceived as an advanced
technology with associated high costs, the technology is increas-
ingly in reach of even small enterprises and is already commonly
used to monitor or predict procedures and processes in industries
such as manufacturing. For this study, we focussed on the use of 4D
simulation to build the ‘common operational picture’, building on
the ‘learn by doing’ principle implicit in the simulation. Park
et al. (2011) has previously found positive impacts of 4D simula-
tion on productivity and safety in the construction industry. The
case study in this paper considers a process that is distributed both
across different roles and geographically across the site and one
which is not frequently undertaken. In such cases, building a com-
mon operational is more difficult as the roles involved do not have
direct experience, and may not routinely work with each other.
Visualisation of the process can help overcome these barriers and
Sacks et al. (2009) and Kang et al. (2007) have shown that logical
errors in construction schedules can be detected quicker and more
reliably using 4D models as compared to 2D drawings. The simula-
tion can facilitate the personnel in visualising and reviewing the
process virtually, suggesting potential improvements, and becom-
ing familiar with the planned process and their role within it
before the work begins. It can therefore be instrumental in devel-
oping a COP in the affected staff. A similar result might be achieved
via a ‘dry-run’ or other planning activity on the actual plant, but
the ability to achieve this in practice can be limited by lack of
access or risk of damage to the plant or injuries to personnel.
Therefore, simulation offers a practical method to optimize, plan
and prepare for infrequent or complex activities and thereby min-
imize the risks during the actual operation.
2.3. Safety analysis
Once the task analysis and simulation are complete, the safety
analysis can be achieved. The task analysis is used as the basic
functional analysis to support a structured hazard identification
workshop, similar to a HAZOP study (Kletz, 2006), where, instead
of plant parts, the nodes in the task analysis are the unit under
analysis and potential performance deviations are considered (as
in Leva et al., 2012; Demichela et al., 2014). For the case study,
an analysis team containing all the required expertise (plant
knowledge, operational knowledge, safety assessment expertise,
human factors knowledge) was assembled to identify and assess
the hazards. The assessment applied a semi-quantitative risk cate-
gory estimation to distinguish between safety and productivity
issues. Each consequence and its associated likelihood was rated
on a scale of 1–5 and the product of these values gave the risk
score. The SCOPE software was used to conduct the hazard
identification and risk categorisation and to document the results
of the assessment (Fig. 2). The capacity to perform the task analy-
sis, hazard identification and risk categorization in one software
application streamlines the analysis and simplifies the documenta-
tion of the analysis itself.
2.4. Optimization
The final step in the approach is to optimize the planned pro-
cess to achieve benefits in terms of safety, efficiency, or productiv-
ity. Two methods can be applied: first, applying Monte Carlo
simulation or second, a simpler Pareto-type analysis. The first
approach can use implementation and operating costs, for exam-
ple, as the dependent variables and the Monte Carlo method
applied to test different options on the use of resources (see
Balfe et al., this issue for an application of this approach). The result
is a local optimization within the system based on cost. For exam-
ple, (sub)tasks that can be carried out in parallel can be identified
and the relative benefit of using more personnel for some or all of
the tasks explored, etc.
The second optimization method applies to the results of the
task analysis and the hazard analysis, where the initial list of tasks
is next refined and subjected to further optimization, considering
the hazards identified and assigned safety measures. This approach
is less complex than the Monte Carlo simulation, and was used in
this case study. This optimization is best applied after the hazards
have been analysed/revealed and the focus applies to non-safety
related aspects such as individual task duration and cost. Opportu-
nities for improvements can be identified using a Pareto type opti-
mization (Pareto, 1906) or other form of sensitivity analysis.
3. Case study – process and results obtained
The case study discussed here is based on the periodic pressure
testing of spherical pressure vessels at the premises of Plinarna
Maribor d.o.o., LPG storage site located in Maribor, Slovenia (pro-
ject partner). In order to understand the situation that led to this
case study, the applicable legal background and implications on
the preparations for the pressure test are explained in Table 1.
The procedure for cold water pressure testing of these vessels
consists of many steps, all of which must be captured in the task
analysis. The specific pressure vessel considered in this case study
is one of two 1000 m3 spherical, above-ground storage tanks at the
premises. Broadly, the procedure involves removing the product
stored in the vessel, inertization (e.g., filling-up with water), con-
ducting the cold water pressure test, emptying the vessel, conduct-
ing an internal visual inspection, ultra-sound and X-ray spot
testing, and then finally returning the vessel to operation. Although
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the older plant personnel were knowledgeable of the overall pro-
cess and could easily produce a high level description of the work,
due to the lack of procedures specific to this site and the use of
other testing methods in recent decades, the detail of durations,
potential hazards and criteria for safety proceeding to the next
step, etc. were not readily accessible to plant personnel. The initial
state of missing knowledge of how to plan the test procedure in
detail was a good example of difference in required COP among
the personnel, procedures to be followed and related equipment.
For example, the plant personnel perceived a large uncertainty
about the overall duration; the required downtime per storage
tank was assumed anything up to two months, however that
deemed outrageous in terms of lost production.1 The study
described here was pursued in order to reduce the uncertainty and
facilitate better planning of the procedure to be used.
Table 1
Summary of case study background and implications for the industrial partner.
The LPG storage plant has two 1000 m3 above ground spherical pressure vessels, constructed in 1970s. The vessels have technical dossiers, including certificates from
the initial and past periodic integrity tests (e.g., using cold water pressure testing). The pressure vessels are regulated in the European Union by a set of legislation
and technical standards:
 At the top is the current Pressure Equipment Directive (PED) – EU, 2014, being transposed to the national legislation of the member states.
 In Slovenia, that is done through Rules on pressure equipment (RS, 2002) and the testing specifically by the Regulation on examination and testing of pressure
equipment (RS, 2008). In addition Rules on liquefied petroleum gas also apply (RS, 1991).
 Details of the testing methods that can be used are set by the applicable European Standard EN 13445-5 Unfired pressure vessels – Part 5: Inspection and testing
(CEN, 2014).
Thus, the current plant management had all the certificates on the integrity of the pressure vessels, but historical work records of the past preparations were not
available any longer (cold water pressure testing was last performed in 2002, subsequently ultra-sound tests from the exterior were applied, as that is also permitted
in the intermediate period).
As mentioned in the Introduction section, the current management were aware of the requirements, but in 2002 the detailed work procedure for preparations, testing
and return to operations was not prepared (permits-to-work were used, but those records are no longer available). The older workers were knowledgeable of the
general description of the work, but details for the specific procedure were not available.
Needless to say, the above mentioned legislation and standards do not specify in a detail how apply the procedure in a specific plant & installation that needs to be
prepared specifically (e.g., following CCPS, 2007, section 10). In addition, the related API publications and standards (e.g., API, 1994, 1996) are helpful here (e.g., API
(1994) Appendix E as a procedure planning checklist), however, again the site-specific procedure needs to be developed in a detail.
To conclude, the plant management’s imperative was to address the uncertainty about the duration of the overall procedure (economic implications), accompanied by
the safety concerns. The aim was not to identify possible improvements to the principal testing and inspection methods (CEN, 2014), but about developing a plan
and subsequently an overall procedure to safely and efficiently implement the testing procedure in a specific plant.a
a Note: There is also anecdotal evidence about the actual practices used in a part of the LPG industry (not specific to a given organization or country) to prepare for the cold
water pressure testing and visual inspection inside of the LPG pressure vessels. Such practices include use of the natural air ventilation to remove the gas phase completely
out of the emptied and opened vessel (thus directly violating the above-mentioned standards and legislation).
Fig. 2. The SCOPE program interface during the task and hazard analysis of the case.
1 Cost of the lost production day was assessed at about 3564 € (2014), while overall
test procedure cost was assessed at about 70,000 € per storage tank.
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3.1. Task analysis
The task analysis was initially based on knowledge of the proce-
dure elicited from site personnel, and was constructed in the
SCOPE software. The development of the task analysis provided
site management with the opportunity to describe the high level
tasks and document details of the foreseen sub-tasks (Fig. 2).
Actors, information, tools and expected duration were also cap-
tured for each envisaged task. In total, 23 main tasks and 115
sub-tasks were identified as the ‘Original’ task list to be pursued
within the testing procedure. This was used as the basis for an
assessment of the total duration, which equated to 368 h
(15.3 days), considering 24/7 operations.
3.2. Creation of 3D visual and 4D model/simulation
In order to provide a basis of the 3D model, the site was exten-
sively digitally photographed. Pictures were taken across the site
from all possible angles of the buildings, equipment and layout
of the site. Photogrammetry software was then used to create
Fig. 3. 4D simulation illustration from the case animation.
Table 2
Summary of recommendations from the safety analysis done over task analysis results.
# Recommendation Related tasks
1 Prepare a detailed written cold water testing procedure, following the tasks identified and implementing the specific recommendations given
next. Suggested main topics:
All
– General and specific planning of the testing (e.g., assurance of the contractors/equipment, list of all personnel (internal/external)),
– Logic sequence of the tasks and sub-tasks, for each to consider validation criteria for completeness, as well as to mention anticipated hazards
and required permitting.
– Testing reporting – progress in time, persons involved – on suitable forms and check-lists, as well as to appoint approvals to next step(s).
2 Use of the torch with two pilot flames with thermal lock system – in order to assure reliable pilot flame 5, 23
3 Consider purging of the remaining LPG gas in the storage tank at level between 95% and 100% by nitrogen, from either car tanker with vaporizer, or
from the bundled bottles.
7, 8, 22
Prepare a detailed nitrogen purging protocol, related to recommendation 1.
4 Permanently monitoring of the tank water fill-in process; to assure adequate staffing and specific appointed person. 7, 22, 23
Setting on the SCADA for an audible alarm at 98% of full tank.
5 The measurement instruments used, are to be checked constantly during the test, related to strain gauges and movement of the tank observations. 7
In case of the deviation(s) stop the procedure, thus the criteria must be defined prior the cold water testing starts.
Note: additional task to be added to the previous task analysis to assure the mentioned equipment and contractors.
6 Plan the engagement of the contractors. Risk assessment of the operations and safety measures to be in place according to the national legislation
on occupational health and safety, e.g., regarding work at height, falling objects/tools, work in closed spaces or potentially oxygen depleted
atmosphere/flammable atmosphere, as well as common workplaces.
8, 16, 18, 20,
21
7 Consider in the procedure to check the water level before removing the valve at the end of task 8 (in order to assure low enough amount of the
remaining gas inside tank).
8
8 In recommendation 1 consider also planning of the suitable crane with long enough arm to reach top of the sphere. 8, 21
9 While planning the high pressure water feed connection from the fire water system into the storage tank (considering the selected high pressure
pump):
9
– specify flexible hose rated for high enough pressure (30 bara) – validate with vendor/supplier,
– as a back up plan for hose failure/leak, prepare in advance a fixed piping, or prepare sufficient fixed pipes and joints parts, to assemble con-
nection on the spot.
10 Plan strict use of the validated and calibrated equipment (e.g., pressure and level measurements), validate also high pressure water specific rate, to
be received from the contracted inspector.
12
11 Plan in a detail where to install blind flanges at the storage tank connections, in order to assure tightness at the connections during the high
pressure test.
12
12 In recommendation 1 consider also correct sequence of actions to lower the water pressure in task 13 (13.3, related to the potential high pressure
water jet, injuring the personnel).
13
13 Plan the electrical wiring and electrical installations to be installed only from the top opening, and not from the bottom opening, in order to
prevent electrocution hazards, related to the potentially falling objects/tools for visual inspections, ultrasound testing and X-ray testing, expected
to be done inside the storage tank.
16, 18, 20
14 Check with the insurance company about the liability coverage on cold water testing procedure, considering the own and the contracted
personnel, as well as the equipment used/present.
All
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the 3D models of the buildings and equipment at the site. These
buildings were placed inside a high-resolution image of the site,
which was taken from Google Earth. The result was a highly accu-
rate and easily recognisable 3D model of the site, which was con-
structed without the effort and cost of manually creating the
model.
The 4D simulation was constructed by combining the 3D model
with information from the task analysis. The behaviour of the indi-
vidual tasks were modelled, including stochastic values for process
and movement times. The simulation resulted in a video of the
planned operation, which was annotated with information from
the task analysis, for example naming each step being carried out
in the video. Thus, the simulation demonstrated the planned
operation in order to support the development of the common
operational picture at the plant by providing a method to commu-
nicate the complex procedures to the plant personnel, and to
facilitate optimization of the tasks. Fig. 3 illustrates a screen
capture from the simulation.
3.3. Safety analysis
The safety analysis took the form of a task based hazard analy-
sis, using both the task analysis and 4D model as inputs and gen-
erating a list of recognised risks and additional safety measures
as outputs. The team identified 26 potential deviations with the
potential to lead to accident scenarios. Three main types of nega-
tive consequences emerged during the analysis which are listed
below in increasing severity:
i. Procedural risks (work delays); examples included too few
fitter personnel at piping re-assembly, crane arm too short
to perform PSV removal at the top of the sphere, and a low
flow-rate for filling the vessel.
ii. Occupational safety risks; examples included personnel
injuries due to LPG torch flame-off/on, working at height,
suffocation or electrocution hazards inside vessel, etc.
iii. Process safety risks; examples included damage to equip-
ment and/or personnel injuries/fatalities due to water
ingress into compressor, tank vessel static overload with
water (deteriorated legs), sphere damage by applying pres-
sure above 25 bar, etc.
The outputs of the analysis were compiled as a list of recom-
mended additional safety measures to be incorporated into the
testing procedure. These are reported in Table 2.
The safety analysis also identified the need for additional,
unforeseen tasks, the possible rescheduling of some subtasks, or
the addition of specific precautions as part of a task. The task anal-
ysis was therefore updated to reflect these changes to the proce-
dure, producing the ‘Optimized’ version of the plan and related
graphical diagrams from the SCOPE software. Both procedures
are presented for comparative purposes in Fig. 4. Changes of note
include the merging of some tasks (e.g. 9 and 10 merged into a
new 9) in order to emphasize close connections between sub-
tasks, the addition of explicit decision points (e.g. new task 17,
old 17 became 18), and the addition of new tasks (final 25. Start
up of the site), with the final Optimized procedure featuring 22
top level tasks.
3.4. Optimization
The total duration of the ‘Original’ procedure was assessed to
about 368 h (15.3 days), considering 24/7 operations. This was
compared to an initial estimate prepared by the plant prior to this
study, based on organisational memory, of about 30 days. For the
‘Optimized’ list of tasks to be pursued within the test procedure,
the total duration was assessed to be about 354 h (14.8 days).
The optimization was obtained by considering the safety recom-
mendations (Table 2) and identification of tasks that can be done
in parallel; the comparative time saving gained from ‘Original’ to
‘Optimized’ list of tasks of about 14 h is also a result of identifica-
tion of overlapping tasks that can be done in parallel (specifically,
main tasks no. 3, 8 and 20).
Fig. 4. Task analysis diagrams for both the Original and the Optimized alternatives
of the cold water pressure testing procedure.
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Next, a Pareto style analysis was applied to optimize the task
list, specifically by sorting the main tasks in decreasing duration
time based on information collected during the task analysis. The
longest tasks were subject to further analysis in order to identify
possibilities to reduce their duration. The cumulative results for
both Original and Optimized procedure alternatives are presented
in Fig. 5. Here it is clear that the top 5 main tasks of the total 22
(22.7%) are related to a cumulative 70.1% or 72.8% of the overall
time, considering Original and Optimized procedure alternatives
respectively.
After consultation with the plant management, it was identified
that some tasks could be accelerated using more resources (e.g.,
contracted personnel), although the same person hours are needed.
This alternative was acknowledged by the management (see
Table 3, e.g., items no. 15 and 20), but not yet evaluated within
the duration of the ‘Optimized’ task list.
While not exactly following the proposed 80/20 Pareto rule, the
approach provided additional insights about tasks that prove the
value of time optimization. In addition, for those tasks optimiza-
tion opportunities were listed, and are to be added to the previous
list in Table 2.
4. Conclusions
This paper has presented an approach to designing and plan-
ning for safety, consisting of interconnected methods and tools,
namely task analysis, 4D simulation, safety (hazard) analysis, and
optimization. The approach is proposed for complex or rare proce-
dures, where there is a level of uncertainty related to the procedure
or its implementation in a new environment. The proposed
approach was tested on a case study of cold water pressure testing
of LPG storage tanks and it identified 26 potential deviations that
could lead to delays, occupational accidents and process safety
accidents. In addition, it provided in total 20 specific recommenda-
tions for the industrial partner on how to plan in detail this infre-
quent and demanding testing procedure. In other words, plant
manager, plant personnel, and contractors all gained better under-
standing and sharing of the Common Operational Picture about the
testing procedure (equipment, resources, interactions), related
hazards, risks and operability and safety measures that shall be
planned and executed. Based on the recommendations, the plant
manager developed a detailed Procedure for periodic testing of
the stationary LPG storage tanks (the procedure is thus a controlled
document within the organization’s management system).
While it was not possible to carry out the actual field testing
procedure in order to compare the performance with the tasks
and evaluate the recommendations in this paper, a comparative
risk assessment among ‘Original’ and ‘Optimized’ alternatives
and cost-benefit analysis is available (Gerbec et al., this issue). In
addition, the plant management provided strong support for the
approach, which provided benefits of increased clarity across all
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Fig. 5. Pareto chart for cumulative duration of 22 main tasks for ‘Original’ and ‘Optimized’ procedure alternatives. Data suggest that top 5 out of 22 overall tasks (22.7%) are
related to 70.1% or 72.8% considering the ‘Original’ and ‘Optimized’ alternatives, respectively.
Table 3
Summary of recommended measures from the optimization step (see Section 3.4 and
Fig. 5). Note that numbering continues from the list provided in Table 2.
# Recommended measures Related
tasks
15 Evaluate alternative to apply more personnel at re-assembly
task for entry flanges and SRVs, as overall person-hours
needed should be the same, thus less time here.
16
16 Evaluate alternatives in organizing work on 8 h per day,
against e.g., 24 h  7 days per week basis, for whole testing
procedure.
12, 16
17 Expected water flow rate into tank is unknown; plan and
perform a small scale tank fill-up test using same conditions
and equipment in order to get at least some estimate.
5
18 Consider using larger pipework (over 200) and/or shorter
pipework, in order to increase water flow out rate and save
time here.
10
19 Assess and plan which tasks and sub-tasks can run in
parallel, e.g., this one during water flow out sub-task.
8
20 Consider more inspection personnel to speed up the work. 12
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stakeholders of the plan, and increased confidence in the time and
resources needed to complete the works.
Finally, the proposed approach can be easily applied on other
safety or production critical operation, especially when the tasks
are hard to visualize and the human factors play a relevant role
(e.g. batch processes). A transferability study of an overhaul proce-
dure at a power plant is described in Balfe et al. (this issue).
Acknowledgements
The work presented in this paper was done in the scope of EU
7FP project TOSCA under grant agreement FP7-NMP-2012-
SMALL-6-310201. The authors would like to thank Plinarna
Maribor d.o.o., Maribor, Slovenia for enabling the case study to
be performed and for fruitful cooperation.
References
Aguilar-Saven, R.S., 2004. Business process modelling: review and framework. Int. J.
Prod. Econ. 90 (2), 129–149.
Annett, J., Duncan, K.D., 1967. Task analysis and training design. Occup. Psychol. 41,
211–221.
API, 1994. Safe Entry and Cleaning of Petroleum Storage Tanks, fourth ed. American
Petroleum Institute (API) Standard 2015.
API, 1996. Fire-Protection Considerations for the Design and Operation of the
Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) Storage Facilities, second ed. American
Petroleum Institute (API) Publication 2510A.
Balfe, N., Leva, M.C., 2014. Human factors analysis in risk assessment: a survey of
methods and tools used in industry. In: Sharples, S., Shorrock, S. (Eds.),
Contemporary Ergonomics 2014. Taylor & Francis, London, pp. 77–84.
Balfe, N., Leva, M.C., Prast, S. Total project planning: integration of task analysis,
safety analysis and optimisation techniques. Saf. Sci. (this issue).
Banks, J., Carson, J., Nelson, B., Nicol, D., 2001. Discrete-event System Simulation.
Prentice Hall, New Jersey.
CCPS, 2007. Guidelines for Risk Based Process Safety. Center for Chemical Process
Safety & John Wiley & Sons.
CEN, 2014. European Standard EN 13445-5 Unfired Pressure Vessels – Part 5:
Inspection and Testing. European Committee for Standardization (CEN).
Chapanis, A., 1996. Human Factors in Systems Engineering. John Wiley & Sons, New
York.
Ciribini, A., Galimberti, G., 2005. 4D project planning and H&S management. In: CIB
W78’s 22nd International Conference on Information Technology in
Construction, June 2005, pp. 19–25.
Demichela, M., Pirani, R., Leva, C., 2014. Human factor analysis embedded in risk
assessment of industrial machines: effects on the safety integrity level. Int. J.
Perform. Eng. 10 (5), 487–496.
Embrey, D., 2000. Task Analysis Techniques. Human Reliability Associates Ltd.
EU, 2014. Directive 2014/68/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15
May 2014 on the Harmonisation of the Laws of the Member States Relating to
the Making Available on the Market of Pressure Equipment. Official Journal of
the European Union, 27.6.2014 <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/
TXT/?uri=uriserv%3AOJ.L_.2014.189.01.0164.01.ENG> (accessed 3.8.2016).
Ganah, A., John, G.A., 2011. Integrating building information modelling and health
and safety for onsite construction. Saf. Health Work 6, 39–45.
Gerbec, M., Baldissone, G., Demichela, M. Design of procedures for rare, new or
complex processes: part 2 – comparative risk assessment and CEA of the case
study. Saf. Sci. (this issue).
Kang, J.H., Anderson, S.D., Clayton, M.J., 2007. Empirical study on the merit of web-
based 4D visualization in collaborative construction planning and scheduling. J.
Constr. Eng. Manage. 133 (6), 447–461.
Kirwan, B., Ainsworth, L.K., 1992. A Guide to Task Analysis. Taylor & Francis, London.
Kletz, T., 2006. HAZOP and HAZAN, Identifying and Assessing Process Industry
Hazards. The Institution of Chemical Engineers.
Leva, M.C., Pirani, R., Demichela, M., Clancy, P., 2012. Human factors issues and the
risk of high voltage equipment: are standards sufficient to ensure safety by
design? Chem. Eng. Trans. 26.
Leva, M.C., Kontogiannis, T., Balfe, N., Plot, E., Demichela, M., 2015. Human factors at
the core of total safety management: the need to establish a common
operational picture. In: Sharples, S., Shorrock, S., Waterson, P. (Eds.),
Contemporary Ergonomics and Human Factors. Taylor & Francis, London, pp.
163–170.
Looney, C.G., 2001. Exploring fusion architecture for a common operational picture.
Inform. Fusion 2 (4), 251–260.
McCarthy, J.C., Wright, P.C., Monk, A.F., Watts, L.A., 1998. Concerns at work:
designing useful procedures. Hum.-Comput. Interact. 13 (4), 433–457.
McDonald, N., Morrison, R., Leva, M.C., Atkinson, B., Mattei, F., Cahill, J., 2011.
Operational modeling and data integration for management and design. In:
Cacciabue, C. et al. (Eds.), Human Modeling in Assisted Transportation. Springer,
pp. 55–63.
McNeese, M.D., Pfaff, M.S., Connors, E.S., Obieta, J.F., Terrell, I.S., Friedenbery, M.A.,
2006. Multiple vantage points of the common operational picture: supporting
international teamwork. In: Proceedings of the Human Factors and Ergonomics
Society 50th Annual Meeting, pp. 467–471.
Pareto, V., 1906. Manuale di Economica Politica. Societa Editrice Libraria, Milan.
Translated into English by A.S. Schwier as Manual of Political Economy, edited
by A.S. Schwier and A.N. Page, 1971. A.M. Kelley, New York.
Park, J., Kim, B., Kim, C., Kim, H., 2011. 3D/4D CAD applicability for life-cycle facility
management. J. Comput. Civ. Eng. 25 (2), 129–138.
Robinson, S., 2004. Simulation – The Practice of Model, Development and Use.
Wiley.
RS, 1991. Rules on Liquefied Petroleum Gas (Pravilnik o utekocˇinjenem naftnem
plinu). Official Gazette of the Republic of Slovenia, No. 22/91, 114/04 and 17/14.
RS, 2002. Rules on Pressure Equipment (Pravilnik o tlacˇni opremi). Official Gazette
of the Republic of Slovenia, No. 15/02, 47/02, 54/03, 114/03, 138/06, 17/11, 101/
11 and 18/15.
RS, 2008. Regulation on Examination and Testing of Pressure Equipment (Pravilnik
o pregledovanju in preskušanju opreme pod tlakom). Official Gazette of the
Republic of Slovenia, No. 92/08 and 17/11.
Sacks, R., Treckmann, M., Rozenfeld, O., 2009. Visualization of work flow to support
lean construction. J. Constr. Eng. Manage. 135 (12), 1307–1315.
Stanton, N.A., Salmon, P.M., Walker, G.H., Baber, C., Jenkins, D.P., 2005. Human
Factors Methods: A Practical Guide to Engineering and Design. Ashgate,
Aldershot, UK <www.humanreliability.com> (accessed 2.2.2016).
8 M. Gerbec et al. / Safety Science xxx (2016) xxx–xxx
Please cite this article in press as: Gerbec, M., et al. Design of procedures for rare, new or complex processes: Part 1 – An iterative risk-based approach and
case study. Safety Sci. (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ssci.2016.08.015
